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Professor Schauer's reexamination of the doctrinal basis for the
constitutional standards of proof applied in public figure libel
cases is a useful exercise. When all is said and done, however, the
rationale underlying the extension of the New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan' actual malice test from public officials to public figures2
remains sound and intact. Any lessening of that standard would
ignore reality, be constitutionally unwarranted, and prove a disser-
vice to the robust, uninhibited debate that distinguishes our
society.3
Although existing law has made the recovery by public figures
for libel difficult, public figures have not been denied an effective
remedy by having to overcome the hurdles of the actual malice
* Vice President and Counsel of Newsweek, Inc. B.A. 1971, Cornell University; J.D. 1974,
Harvard University; M.C.P. 1974, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Diploma in Urban
Design and Regional Planning 1976, University of Edinburgh. The author is grateful for the
critical comments and invaluable assistance of Stephen Froling and Alan Silverman. The
views expressed here are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of
Newsweek, Inc.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
3. See 376 U.S. at 270. Indeed the first amendment does not simply benefit institutions
such as the press, but ensures that all of us can speak our minds. See Bose Corp. v. Con-
sumers Union of United States, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1961 (1984). Justice Brennan, architect of
the New York Times actual malice standard, observed in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967):
The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expres-
sion or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy govern-
ment.... "Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this
nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropri-
ate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
period."
... Those guarantees are not for the benefit of the press so much as for the
benefit of all of us. A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the mainte-
nance of our political system and an open society.
Id. at 388-89 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
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standard of New York Times4-despite what Professor Schauer
would have us believe.5 The justification for treating public figures
in the same manner as public officials by requiring both to prove
subjective awareness of falsity far outweighs the justification for
any lesser standard.
II. AN OBJECTIVE TEST
My views on this issue are influenced greatly by a question
which Professor Schauer considers only briefly: if the actual malice
test is not applied to publications concerning public figures, what
test will the courts apply as an alternative? Often, commentators
suggest a purportedly objective test,7 which would seek to deter-
mine that which the defendant should have known if it had ob-
served some particular standard of behavior, to replace the pur-
portedly subjective New York Times test, which seeks to
determine what the defendant actually did know at the time of
4. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967); Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1062 (1977); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976); Goldwater v. Ginzburg,
414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970); Burnett v. National En-
quirer, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1321 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1981), modified, 144 Cal. App. 3d 991,
193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1260 (1984); Nevada Indep. Broad-
casting Co. v. Allen, 664 P.2d 337 (Nev. 1983).
5. See Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 905, 907-08 (1984).
6. "[D]ifferentiation between 'public figures' and 'public officials' and adoption of sepa-
rate standards of proof for each have no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy."
Butts, 388 U.S. at 163.
7. Some courts and commentators, including Professor Schauer, concerned with the diffi-
culty of applying the subjective New York Times test in public figure cases, have hinted at
rejecting the actual malice standard in favor of an objective test. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, for example, noted that
[i]f we convert these subjective "malice" standards into a more objective test,
as suggested by Deans Prosser and Wade and Justice Harlan, we find no evi-
dence that the defendant was guilty of "highly unreasonable conduct constitut-
ing an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting
ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers."
Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1116 (6th Cir. 1978) (quoting Butts, 388 U.S. at 155
(Harlan, J.)), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979). See also Schultz v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
468 F. Supp. 551, 563 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Schauer, supra note 5, at 932-33; Wade; The Com-
municative Torts and the First Amendment, 48 Miss. L.J. 671, 686 (1977).
From my perspective, the idea that an objective test focuses on what the defendant
should have known instead of what the defendant actually did know seems unusual. Never-
theless, to avoid confusion, I will adopt the terminology in this Article.
958
PUBLIC FIGURES REVISITED
publication. In what is frequently and mistakenly identified as the
majority opinion in Butts,8 for example, Justice Harlan proposed
that a public figure should not recover unless he or she could show
"highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure
from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily ad-
hered to by responsible publishers." 9 Like Professor Schauer, other
courts and commentators have suggested variations on Justice
Harlan's theme 0 and, in a number of cases the press has been held
to such objective standards of conduct.1
These objective standards of conduct, however, are unworkable
and have no foundation in the first amendment. The first major
problem with any objective test is that objective standards simply
do not exist. Responsible publishers do not have the generally rec-
ognized standards normally associated with traditional, learned
professions. They possess no equivalent of generally accepted ac-
counting principles, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
statements, the American Institute of Architects' standards, or a
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Furthermore, I doubt that universal standards could be adopted
by the press. Aside from the constitutional problems inherent in
adopting even self-imposed rules of professional conduct for jour-
nalists, nothing suggests that the profession could reach a consen-
sus on the issue. Every press room has an established mode of op-
eration and a set of journalistic ethics that is unique. Guidelines in
one organization are not even an issue for discussion in another.
The famous two-source rule from the Watergate days is a proce-
dure that was followed by one group of reporters, on one story, at
8. "Although Mr. Justice Harlan announced the result in [Butts], a majority of the Court
agreed with Mr. Chief Justice Warren's conclusion that the New York Times test should
apply to criticism of 'public figures' as well as 'public officials'." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 336 (1974). See Schauer, supra note 5, at 907 & n.19.
9. 388 U.S. at 155. Justice Harlan's opinion is not a correct statement of law. As the
Supreme Court has stated, this formulation was rejected in favor of the actual malice rule in
public figure cases. See supra note 8.
10. See supra note 7.
11. See, e.g., Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 341 N.E.2d
569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975) ("[Wlhere the content of the article is arguably within
the sphere of legitimate public concern, which is reasonably related to matters warranting
public exposition, the party defamed may recover [if he can establish] that the publisher
acted in a grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of infor-
mation gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties.").
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one newspaper.12 It is not a universal standard of conduct in news-
rooms across the country. To my knowledge, it is not widely fol-
lowed anywhere.
The lack of standards has not been remedied by the courts. In
Butts, Justice Harlan's only reference to the standards of investi-
gation and reporting of responsible publishers was a speech deliv-
ered in 1947 by Arthur Hays Sulzberger, then publisher of the New
York Times.13 The speech does not outline a code of ethics for
journalists, however-it is distinctly an inspirational and aspira-
tional speech setting out goals that no newspaper could meet on a
daily basis.
From a litigation perspective, objective tests suggest that the ac-
tivities of a defendant will be compared to the conduct of other
publishers. Because judges and jurors probably will have no first-
hand knowledge of media practices, factfinders will be required to
examine newsroom practices in other organizations. Full explora-
tion and comparative analysis of other publishers' conduct, how-
ever, might not withstand constitutional scrutiny. The unique facts
surrounding each story also preclude the accurate comparison of
conduct necessary for establishing a standard. The question of
whose imprecise practices will become the standard by which all
others are measured, therefore, must also be resolved. Absent a
generally accepted standard of care, any attempt to provide litiga-
tion and newsroom legal advice based on the notion that objective
standards actually exist is unrealistic.
The second problem with objective tests is that they may stifle
the freedom of speech and press that the first amendment was
adopted to ensure. Journalists spend a great amount of time work-
ing with material that is not subject to practical empirical verifica-
tion. Like In a Grove,'4 the Japanese short story in which each of
the protagonists told a different story about the same event, news
events are not subject to precise replication and impressions of the
events are inherently subjective. In many cases, journalists obtain
12. See C. BERNSTEIN & B. WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN 79 (1974) ("Gradually,
an unwritten rule was evolving: unless two sources confirmed a charge involving activity
likely to be considered criminal, the specific allegation was not used in the paper.").
13. 388 U.S. at 155 (Harlan, J.) (citing Sulzberger, Responsibility and Freedom, in FREE-
DOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT 409 (Nelson ed. 1967)).
14. R. AKUTAGAWA, In A Grove, in RASHOMON AND OTHER STORIES 19 (1970).
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their information from observers who simply happened to be at the
scene of an event, or from observers who are interested in the
event and may thus have a bias that may not be obvious to a re-
porter. Based on these sources, reporters and editors have to make
immediate judgments about the reliability of their sources and the
way in which to describe the observed events.
Just as no objective standards specify how events should be ob-
served, no generally agreed upon standard specifies how events
ought to be described. To some, the statement that "truckloads of
police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State
College campus,"15 or that sound moved "about the room, ' 16 may
accurately describe an event. To others, these statements may
seem inaccurate enough to support libel claims. The problem is
that objective standards of observation and expression do not exist
and, in light of first amendment considerations, cannot be created.
Journalism may be unique in this respect. Unlike the testing of
prescription drugs17 or airplane parts, we cannot examine a thou-
sand samples of journalists' observations and reporting techniques
and make a statistical table of the results. Even if we could poll all
of tlie observers, we could not be certain that the majority would
perceive what actually happened. Moreover, the first amendment
rests on the assumption that someone may have a unique percep-
tion or manner of expression that ultimately proves to be correct.1 "
Finally, objective tests are defective because of the significance
of time constraints. Time is a critical element in any objective de-
cision about the treatment of a news story and is important in de-
15. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 257 (1964).
16. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1953 (194).
17. Cf. Schauer, supra note 5, at 927 (analogizing commentary about public figures to the
development and manufacture of pharmaceuticals).
18. Even if we could develop objective standards for the press, we most likely would de-
feat the first amendment's ability to preserve "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate
on public issues. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270. Objective standards would straitjacket a
free press and result in a monolithic presentation of the news, allowing little room for de-
bate. Far more acceptable is the notion "[tihat erroneous statement is inevitable in free
debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breath-
ing space' that they 'need ... to survive."' Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). See also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967). Like the
answer to the philosophical question whether the glass is half full or half empty, the correct
observation and expression of an event is often a matter of perception, and more than one
view may be accurate.
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termining whether a publisher was sufficiently careful. News must
be disseminated quickly-that is how news distinguishes itself
from history. Time is at the root of most newsroom decisions about
further investigation and rewriting. Given adequate time, one can
always find one more source to check, one more person to call, a
slightly more articulate or accurate way to state a fact or opinion.
The time factor is complicated, and the importance of prompt
dissemination can easily be forgotten once litigation has com-
menced. One cannot conceive of a libel case in which the plaintiff's
counsel would be unable or unwilling to suggest that additional
facts should have been checked. And, once such a suggestion is
made, a factfinder cannot reconstruct and evaluate correctly the
objective adequacy of an investigation that did not include the ad-
ditional facts, even if those facts did not occur to anyone at the
time. The additional facts assume increased importance during liti-
gation and the factfinder loses sight of that which was actually
done to prepare the story. The passage of time obscures the impact
of time pressure on an investigation in a way that almost always
favors libel plaintiffs at the expense of the media. The Court iden-
tified the problem of objective tests in Time, Inc. v. Hill's when it
observed that "[a] negligence test [or any other objective test]
would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a
jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify
the accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or portrait. ' '20
III. WHY TREAT PUBLIC FIGURES LIKE PUBLIC OFFICIALS?
The previous discussion pertains equally to any sort of libel
plaintiff. Professor Schauer, therefore, properly asks what makes
19. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
20. Id. at 389. Moreover, in reviewing the history and precedents for its opinion, the
Court noted that "[w]e create a grave risk of serious impairment of the indispensable service
of a free press in a free society if we saddle the press with the impossible burden of verifying
to a certainty the facts associated in news articles .... Even negligence would be a most
elusive standard, especially when the content of the speech itself affords no warning of pro-
spective harm to another through falsity. ...
In this context, sanctions against either innocent or negligent misstatement would present
a grave hazard of discouraging the press from exercising the constitutional guarantees.
Those guarantees are not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all of us.
A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our political system and
an open society." Id.
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public figures different. He refers to two archetypal public
figures-political public figures who are in a position to influence
public policies and political decisionmaking, and nonpolitical pub-
lic figures, such as entertainers or personalities.2 1 Although Profes-
sor Schauer seems to agree that New York Times ought to apply to
the former," he questions whether the same doctrinal considera-
tions apply to the latter.
I am not persuaded that the Court did rule, as Professor Schauer
seems to think, that mere personalities are subject to the New
York Times test.23 For three reasons, however, sound first amend-
ment doctrine ought to include them under the same actual malice
rubric as public officials and political public figures.
A. The Political-Nonpolitical Dichotomy
Even if political matters lie at the core of the first amendment,4
"politics" should not be defined narrowly. People and institutions
21. Although I have adopted Professor Schauer's political-nonpolitical dichotomy for con-
venience, see Schauer, supra note 5, at 916-17, the potentially appealling theoretical distinc-
tion has no basis in reality. See infra text accompanying notes 24-31.
22. See Schauer, supra note 5, at 918, 931-32, 934-35 (suggesting that courts might be
able to subdivide the class of public figures, applying New York Times to some public
figures, and some lesser standard to others).
23. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), identified two types of public
figures-those who "occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are
deemed public figures for all purposes [and, m]ore commonly, those [who] have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the reso-
lution of the issues involved." Id. at 345. Although we typically refer to the all-purpose
public figure and assume that the category includes movie stars, television entertainers, and
baseball players, the formulation actually adopted by the Court is firmly rooted in a concept
of power and influence, not just notoriety. Later cases demonstrate that general notoriety is
not enough. Elmer Gertz had been active in a variety of "community and professional af-
fairs" and had written several books and articles, 418 U.S. at 351, and Mary Alice Firestone
had abundant notoriety, see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976), but neither
was held to be a public figure, see Time, 424 U.S. at 455; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. See also
National Found. for Cancer Research v. Council of Better Business Bureaus, 705 F.2d 98,
101 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 108 (1983); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, 691 F.2d
666, 668 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1277 (1983); Woy v. Turner, 573 F. Supp.
35, 38 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 8 Media L. Rep. 2262, 2266
(D.D.C. 1982); Ali v. Daily News Publishing Co., 540 F. Supp. 142, 145-46 (D.V.L 1982);
Rood v. Finney, 418 So. 2d 1 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 420 So. 2d 979 (La. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1254 (1983); Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing Ltd., 89 N.J. 451,
-, 446 A.2d 469, 475-76, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982); Howard v. Buffalo Evening
News, 89 A.D.2d 793, 453 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1982).
24. See Schauer, supra note 5, at 918-19, 930.
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in our society may be organized, challenged, or restructured in
ways other than through governmental processes. In some cases,
such as religion, we have prohibited governmental involvement.
The process is nevertheless political, however, because speech con-
cerning religious ideas profoundly affects the way society is organ-
ized. In other cases, such as literature, distinguishing political and
nonpolitical speech is almost impossible. Richard 11125 and The
Marriage of Figaro,26 now thought of as art or entertainment, were
highly political when written. Unlike Professor Schauer, 7 I do not
believe that a broad definition jeopardizes protection of true politi-
cal speech. Political speech is no more than a specific application
of a broader principle.
Both the Court and commentators frequently have recognized
that the core of the first amendment is much broader than legisla-
tive or elective politics:
Self-governance in the United States presupposes far more than
knowledge and debate about the strictly official activities of va-
rious levels of government. The commitment of the country to
the institution of private property, protected by the Due Process
and Just Compensation Clauses in the Constitution, places in
private hands vast areas of economic and social power that vi-
tally affect the nature and quality of life in the Nation. Our ef-
forts to live and work together in a free society not completely
dominated by governmental regulation necessarily encompass
far more than politics in a narrow sense. "The guarantees for
speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or
comment upon public affairs." 8
Authors, actors, television chefs, singers, athletes, and other public
figures probably have as much influence on politics in the broad
sense as public officials. On matters of style, food, the use of drugs,
religion, and scores of other topics, personalities shape our society
25. W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING RICHARD THE THIRD (1593).
26. P. DE BEAUMARCHAIS & W. MOZART, THE MARRIAGE OF FIGARO (1786).
27. See Schauer, supra note 5, at 930-31.
28. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41 (1971) (Brennan, J.) (quoting Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967)). See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
147 (1967) (Harlan, J.); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940); Emerson, The
State of the First Amendment as We Enter "1984", 2 Com. Law. 3, 5 (1984); Hill, Defama-
tion and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1205 (1976).
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much more than public officials.
Furthermore, if we limit the reach of New York Times to public
officials and to those Professor Schauer would call "political" pub-
lic figures, 9 and apply a new standard to nonpolitical public
figures, the impact on what could be reported would be enormous.
The number of pure political cases to which Professor Schauer
would apply actual malice standards is small in comparison to the
number of public figure cases involving broad economic and social
issues-many of which involve the free debate that lies at the
heart of the first amendment. I do not think anyone would deny
that Jesse Jackson and Walter Mondale are public figures for
whom the New York Times doctrine ought to apply.30 What about
Carl Sagan, William Buckley, Linus Pauling, Jane Fonda, Lee
Iacocca, and Jerry Falwell? None are public officials, but presuma-
bly all would fall into the category of public figures. These are all
individuals who influence public opinion, contemporary society,
and the way we think, although not necessarily in a political way.
Using Reggie Jackson, Carol Burnett, and Clint Eastwood as ar-
chetypal personalities to suggest that commentary about personali-
ties should be less protected than commentary about public offi-
cials and public figures involved in political decisionmaking is
fraught with danger. Construing the first amendment to encourage
the press to report on Patrick O'Keefe, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Employment and Training for the Department of Labor, or
Frank Swaine, the Small Business Administration's Chief Counsel
for Advocacy, or even a recreation supervisor in New Hampshire 31
while requiring greater circumspection in reporting the activities of
Jerry Falwell would be ironic.
B. The Personal Freedom to Express Ideas
Unfortunately, in some quarters of the academic community,
proposals to restrict coverage of the first amendment to the politi-
cal process still are being pressed."2 I do not accept the political
29. See Schauer, supra note 5, at 916-17.
30. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
31. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
32. The attempt by the academic community to formulate rules of law that will
give realistic protection to the First Amendment rights has not moved forward.
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process rationale as the only core of first amendment concerns, al-
though the unanimous consensus is that the amendment covers at
least that much.33 In his strategic retreat from his principal pre-
mise, Professor Schauer recognizes the importance of nonpolitical
concerns.3 4 Personal freedom seems equally important, if not more
so. The Court has frequently recognized this point, most recently
in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States:3 5 "The First
Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak one's mind is
not only an aspect of individual liberty-and thus a good unto it-
self-but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the
vitality of society as a whole. '3 6 The value of the first amendment
"is not merely the cultivation of uninhibited expression with a
view to the potential contribution of such expression to the com-
mon good, but more fundamentally the protection of the
speaker from governmental restraint-a sense that the speaker
has a right to be let alone in the absence of compelling reason to
the contrary. '37
The same point, moreover, was tacitly recognized in Time, Inc. v.
Hill,3 8 a case that arose from a story about a play. 9 The core of the
first amendment is not politics alone, but the discussion of ideas.
Thus, no relevant first amendment difference appears to exist
between public officials and personalities. By voluntarily seeking
public recognition, acclaim, and support, both invite public discus-
sion of their activities.40 Both public officials and public figures
also typically have access to the media, and thus are presumptively
On the contrary, theories of limitation are being advanced in some quarters.
Thus, proposals to restrict coverage of the First Amendment to "political ex-
pression," that is, participation in the affairs of government, are still being
pressed.
Emerson, supra note 28, at 5.
33. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
34. See Schauer, supra note 5, at 929-30.
35. 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
36. Id. at 1961. See also supra note 3.
37. Hill, supra note 28, at 1208. See also R. SACK, LmIEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED
PROBLEMS 16-17 (1980).
38. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
39. See supra note 20.
40. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
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able to rebut publications that they consider inaccurate.41
C. The Potential for Distortion
Finally, I am not persuaded that Professor Schauer's back side
analysis focuses on the right process.42 Although some states have
codified their libel laws, rarely do I worry that a potential libel
plaintiff will influence the outcome of a case through the legislative
process; generally, libel law is made by judges and juries. Of
greater concern is the factfinders' ability to confuse easily the pop-
ularity of a person at a particular time and place with the truth of
statements made by or about that person. Statistics concerning the
trial of libel cases suggest that this happens frequently; juries re-
turn a high proportion of verdicts for plaintiffs, which are then
overturned in an equally high proportion by judges.'
Politicians expertly organize support for themselves and their
ideas within the community. The danger is that they will use their
abilities to persuade the jury to suppress unpopular, but truthful,
statements. Entertainers, athletes, and other personalities may not
have any direct governmental power to affect the rules of law by
which cases are decided, but they certainly have the same ability
to organize public opinion and present precisely the same danger
as politicians: that they also might persuade juries to mistake pop-
ularity for truth and punish the unpopular.
41. Id. at 344.
42. See Schauer, supra note 5, at 921-29.
43. LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, BULL. No. 7, INDEPENDENT APPELLATE REVIEW IN
LIBEL ACTIONS SINCE New York Times v. Sullivan (1983). A statistical analysis of the ap-
peals of rulings on the adequacy of proof of actual malice in defamation cases revealed that
70% of appeals of the defendants with respect to findings or rulings about
actual malice led to reversals. When analysis is confined to review after a trial,
71% of defendants' appeals in cases involving rulings on actual malice have led
to reversals.
Given the fact that only 19% of all civil cases heard by federal Courts of
Appeals not involving the United States are reversed, the strikingly high rever-
sal rates in actual malice cases and particularly in cases in which actual malice
was held to exist at the trial court level are themselves persuasive evidence of
the need for the careful appellate scrutiny of actual malice determinations.
Brief for the New York Times Company as Amicus Curiae at 17, Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Commentary about public figures is "a concomitant of life in a
civilized community."44 If we confine the actual malice standard to
commentary about public officials and public figures involved in
political decisionmaking, thereby sacrificing a broadly defined free-
dom of the press, we will have eliminated "the 'breathing space'
that [the freedoms of expression] 'need ... to survive.' "45 1 agree
with Chief Justice Warren's conclusion in Butts, therefore, that
"differentiation between 'public figures' and 'public officials' and
adoption of separate standards of proof for each have no basis in
law, logic, or first amendment policy. '46
44. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
45. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
46. 388 U.S. at 163.
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